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In the article that provides the focus for this dialog, Bulterman-Bos raises two central 
questions about educational research: what should educational research seek to do, and how 
should it go about doing this?
Stokes (1997) suggests that there are two crucial issues in the conduct of research: whether 
the research is conducted with a concern for how the results of the research will be used, 
and whether the research is conducted with a concern for fundamental understanding 
(Figure 1). Where neither of these is a concern the result is applied research unmotivated by 
applications, which Stokes suggests is exemplified by the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe. 
Where usage is a concern, but fundamental understanding is not, the result is pure applied 
research, exemplified by the work of Thomas Edison. Conversely, where fundamental 
understanding is a concern, but application is not, we have pure basic research, exemplified 
by the work of the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. Finally, where both considerations of use, 
and fundamental understanding are important, we have “Pasteur’s quadrant”—use-inspired 
basic research.
<< Figure 1 about here >>
Almost from its first emergence as a field of inquiry, educational research has been 
criticized for its lack of relevance to practice—and in particular that too much educational 
research has emphasized a quest for fundamental understanding at the expense of 
considerations of use. In 1945, J. Cayce Morrison, assistant commissioner for research in 
the State Education Department in New York, lamented that there was “too wide a gap 
between research at its best and much of its practice in education” (Morrison, 1945, p. 243).
The frustration appears to be caused, at least in part, by an expectation that while it was 
easy to accept that problems in nuclear physics and rocket science might be difficult to 
solve, educational problems should be much more tractable. As early as 1917, H. L. 
Mencken pointed out that problems in the social sciences were generally far more complex 
than they appeared: “There is always an easy solution to every human problem—neat, 
plausible, and wrong” (Mencken, 1917/1949 p. 443).
A similar perception appears to have driven Robert F Kennedy, in the hearings of the 
Senate sub-committee on Education in 1966 to ask the Commissioner of the United States 
Office of Education, Harold “Doc” Howe II, “What happened to the children? Do you 
mean you spent a billion dollars and you don't know whether they can read or not?” 
(McLaughlin, 1975).
Implicit in such criticism, there is often an underlying belief that educational researchers 
make things complicated because they enjoy or value the complexity. While there may be a 
small element of truth to such criticism, in most cases, researchers make things complicated 
because they are complicated; they have learned that approaches that elide, or refuse to 
acknowledge, these complexities have not been successful in addressing the challenges of 
improving educational outcomes. Consider the issue of class-size reduction policies.
Class-size reduction programs (CSRPs) are an attractive route to improving educational 
achievement, being popular with both parents and teachers. However, given the high cost of 
implementation, it would seem advisable to get some clear evidence of the likely benefits 
before embarking on such a program, especially given the political difficulties of reversing 
such reforms.
The issue of class-size reduction would seem to be an ideal candidate for rigorous, high 
quality research, and indeed there is no shortage of well-designed studies on the effects of 
CSRPs. Perhaps the best-known of these is the Tennessee Student-Teacher Achievement 
Ratio (STAR) study, described by Mosteller (1995) as “one of the greatest education 
experiments in United States history”. Teachers and students in kindergarten and first grade 
were assigned at random either to small classes (13-17 students), large classes (22-26 
students) or large classes with a teacher’s aide. By the end of third grade, student 
achievement was significantly higher, especially in reading, and the gains were most 
marked for socio-economically disadvantaged students and those from minority ethnic 
communities. More importantly, when the students returned to larger classes, although 
some of the advantage of the smaller classes diminished (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001), 
students who had experienced smaller classes had a lower rate of grade-retention (Pate-
Bain et al., 1997) and higher aspirations to continue education beyond school, evidenced by 
increased tendency to take the SAT (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001). The fact that the
improvements were maintained over such a long period of time is significant, since so 
many educational interventions have yielded initially promising effects that disappear when 
a program is ended (e.g., Head Start: see Brody, 1992: pp. 175-175).
The size of the impact found in the star study was equivalent to an extra three or four 
months learning per year for the students in the smaller classes, with effects up to twice as 
great for minority students. So far, so good. Except, of course, it is not as simple as that. 
First, the STAR study appeared to have no difficulty in recruiting additional teachers 
without a reduction in average teacher quality, which is unlikely to be the case when such a 
program is implemented on a state-wide or national basis (what economists call equilibrium 
effects). In evaluating a CSRP in California, Jepson and Rivkin (2002) found that the 
decline in teacher quality reduced, and in some cases completely negated, the effect of 
smaller classes. Second, the STAR study found that the smaller classes made faster 
progress in kindergarten and first grade, and thereafter, the gap between the smaller and 
larger classes stayed constant. The fact that the earlier gains were maintained is important, 
but so is that fact that smaller classes appeared to confer little benefit in second grade and 
beyond. Indeed, the consistent finding across the research literature on CSRPs is that 
effects are strongest in grades K to 3, much weaker in grades 4 to 8, and practically non-
existent in grades 9 to 12. These two points suggest that the benefits of CSRPs as system-
wide reforms are likely to be significantly smaller than found in the STAR study, and 
suggests that the money might more profitably be spent in other ways. The research 
working in Bohr’s quadrant, concerned only with fundamental understanding, might be 
content to stop here, but the fundamental limitation of this analysis is that it tells us only 
about what did happen in the STAR study, rather than what might be possible with reduced 
class sizes. One of the most intriguing findings of the study was that the teachers in the 
study do not appear to have changed their teaching approaches very much. Clearly some 
teaching approaches that are feasible with 15 students are more difficult with classes of 22 
and may be impossible for the average teacher with a class of 30 students. It is possible, 
therefore, that the potential effects of CSRPs may be significantly greater than has been 
found to date, because few studies have systematically investigated class-size reduction 
combined with inservice training for teachers on how they can best make use of smaller 
classes (although there are significant exceptions, such as Blatchford, Basset, Goldstein, & 
Martin, 2003).
The lesson I wish to draw from this brief example is that in education, what we can learn 
from the scientifically detached approach—in the terminology used by Labaree (2003), an 
approach that emphasizes the analytic, the theoretical, the universal, and the intellectual— 
provides only a part of the story and the scientifically detached account is partial in both 
senses of the word. It provides only a partial picture, and, more importantly, it is a picture 
that is actually misleading. As the work of Blatchford et al. (2003) shows, class-size 
reduction programs do offer significant possibilities for improving educational outcomes at 
scale, but only when they are combined with well-designed programs of inservice support 
for teachers.
So, what seemed at the outset like a very clear simple question does not have a clear simple 
answer. Given the equilibrium effects, and the age-specificity, found in most CSRPs, it 
seems that the costs might well not justify the benefits, and other uses of the money could 
well produce better returns. If, however, the question is changed from “by how much have 
class-size reduction programs improved student outcomes?” to “by how much can class-
size reduction programs improved student outcomes in the past?” then we may get very 
different answers, but only if we are prepared to tangle with the messy reality of the 
contingent and the variable.
The relationship between physics and engineering may be an instructive parallel here. To 
design a bridge that will be safe in operation, it is necessary to know the physical properties 
of the materials to be used, such as knowing that stone is a reliable material to use in 
compression, but behaves unpredictably in tension, while steel and, to a lesser extent, 
wood, are relatively predictable in their behavior in both tension and compression. 
However, precise knowledge of these kinds of properties does not provide any guidance 
about what the bridge should look like. The detailed knowledge of the physical properties 
of the materials will indicate whether a particular design is likely to be effective, but they 
do not, by themselves, provide guidance about how to generate the design. Designing a 
bridge, requires knowledge of the properties of the materials to be sure, but at its heart is a 
fundamental creative process, substantially under-determined by the physics.
In the same way, the challenge of “engineering” effective learning environments requires 
knowledge of the findings of educational research, but this research, no matter how well it 
is done, underdetermines what is possible. Rather than limiting the enterprise of educational 
research to the pursuit of “knowledge” (in the sense of collections of items of generally 
agreed upon information) and the development of theories, it seems therefore that a more 
appropriate focus would be that of actually moving people—teachers, teacher educators, 
school administrators, policy makers, etc.—to action (Wiliam & Lester, 2008).
This is the heart of the argument made by Bulterman-Bos—a call for a change in focus in 
educational research from what is correct, to what is good. This echoes the arguments made 
by Bent Flyvbjerg in his book Making social science matter. There, Flyvbjerg argues that 
social enquiry is at its least successful when it attempts to emulate the natural sciences, 
adopting as its central criterion analytic rationality. In contrast, social enquiry is at its most 
successful when it focuses instead on value rationality (Weber, 1914/1978).
In framing this argument, Flyvbjerg draws on the three principal intellectual virtues 
proposed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, 1976): episteme, techne, and 
phronesis. Episteme (ἐπιστήμη) concerns knowledge of eternal and universal truths, such as 
the fact that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal. Once one has established, for 
example by reasoning from Euclid’s postulates, that the base angles of an isosceles triangle 
are, indeed, equal, there is no need to re-verify that it remains the case on another occasion. 
As episteme, it will be true for all time and all (Euclidean) space. Episteme equates to what 
we call scientific knowledge, and according to Aristotle:
is a demonstrative state, (i.e., a state of mind capable of demonstrating what it knows)...i.e., a person has 
scientific knowledge when his belief is conditioned  in a certain way, and the first principles are known to 
him; because if they are not better known to him than the conclusion drawn from them, he will have 
knowledge only incidentally. This may serve as a description of scientific knowledge. (Aristotle, 1976 
1139b18-36)
Episteme therefore embodies the notion of scientific detachment. The privileging of 
scientific detachment is not necessarily a philosophical choice—it could be driven simply 
by a concern for parsimony. On the grounds that parsimonious explanations are to be 
preferred to more complex and convoluted explanations, all other things being equal, then 
the attraction of scientific detachment is clear. If we can establish that something is always 
the case, then once this has been done, we can rely on the same truth forever, and in all 
contexts. However, scientific detachment delivers the goods only when there such timeless 
universal truths exist. Where they do not, different intellectual virtues are required.
Techne (τέχνη), in contrast, is the virtue of being able to bring into being those things that 
are contingent and variable. It differs from episteme in that episteme is concerned with 
things that are the way they are of necessity (otherwise they would not be eternal truths), 
whereas techne deals with things that could be different from what they, in fact, are. 
Since (for example) building is an art [techne] and is essentially a reasoned productive state, and since 
there is no art that is not a state of this kind, and no state of this kind that is not an art, it follows that art is 
the same as a productive state that is truly reasoned. Every art is concerned with bringing something into 
being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that is capable either of 
being or of not being....For it is not with things that are or come to be of necessity that art is concerned 
[this is the domain of episteme] nor with natural objects (because these have their origin in themselves). 
… Art . . . operate[s] in the sphere of the variable.
Although Aristotle discussed techne in terms of the ability to make things such as tables 
and buildings, the ability to bring into being, for example, an effective tax regime would 
also be regarded as techne. It is the ability to bring into being those things that need not be 
the way they are. By itself, however, techne is no guarantee that the building, the table, or 
the tax regime, will be fit for the purpose for which it was created.
Aristotle’s third principal intellectual virtue, phronesis (φρόνησις)—“prudence” or 
“practical wisdom”—in some senses transcends both episteme and techne since it concerns 
the problem of acting raitionally (literally, “along with reason”) in situations that are 
contingent and variable. According to Aristotle, phronesis is the ability “to deliberate 
rightly about what is good and advantageous” (Aristotle, 1976, 1140).  Aristotle points out 
that this is quite different from episteme since there is no point in deliberating about things 
that are universally true—phronesis requires knowledge of particular (variable and 
contingent) circumstances. Phronesis is also different from techne since it is designed to 
move people to action rather than production. Aristotle’s point here is that techne is product 
oriented because the aim of the production is not the production itself but the product, 
whereas action is process-oriented—the end is doing well.
Since episteme deals with universal truths, it is independent of individual experience. Those 
with different experiences should be able to agree on the extent to which a particular claim 
is universally true (the “view from nowhere” supposedly secured with scientific 
detachment). With phronesis, however, individual experience is crucial:
Whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and mathematics, and wise within these limits, 
prudent young people do not seem to be found. The reason is that prudence is concerned with particulars 
as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks 
experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it (Nichomachean Ethics 1142a).
Although phronesis is relevant only when there is no universal truth, that does not mean 
there are no general principles involved. Phronesis is the practical wisdom to act well by 
the successful integration of general principles with detailed consideration of the 
specificities of the particular case in question. From this perspective, the notion of clinical 
research practice involves, for the practitioner, a move from techne to phronesis. While the 
primary intellectual virtue required of the traditional educational researcher is closest to 
episteme, and the expert practitioner demonstrates techne, the teacher/researcher envisaged 
by Bulterman-Bos transcends these by the acquisition of phronesis. It requires the 
knowledge of the general findings from the educational research literature, but requires the 
ability to interpret these general principles in the light of a specific context of practice.
The physical sciences have succeeded because they have focused on episteme. And there 
are some aspects of the social sciences that are fruitfully explored with episteme. But in the 
main, within the social sciences and specifically in education there are few universal truths, 
because successful action will always require the integration of general principles and 
specific contextual details. In this context, it is important to note that while some authors 
have likened the distinction between episteme and phronesis to the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to inquiry (e.g., Laitin, 2003), this is emphatically 
not the case, as Flyvbjerg notes:
Phronetic social science is opposed to an either/or and stands for a both/and on the question of qualitative 
versus quantitative methods. Phronetic social science is problem-driven and not methodology-driven, in 
the sense that it employs those methods which for a given problematic best help answer the four value-
rational questions [Where are we going? Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? 
Is this development desirable? What, if anything, should we do about it?]. More often than not, a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will do the task and do it best. (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 
196)
While Aristotle’s account is useful for thinking about the kinds of expertise that might be 
required of different roles in the educational enterprise, this formulation provides little 
advice about how this expertise might be acquired or developed (apart simply from 
experience). For this, the classification of different kinds of systems of inquiry proposed by 
Churchman (1971) provides a useful organizing principle.
Churchman  proposed a classification of inquiry systems based on what was the primary or 
most salient form of evidence, and he labeled each category of inquiry system with the 
name of a philosopher whose own stance, according to Churchman, typified the category: 
Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and Singer.
In Leibnizian inquiry system, certain fundamental assumptions are made, from which 
deductions are drawn by the use of formal reasoning. Within a Leibnizian enquiry system 
the most important form of evidence is rationality—whether the conclusions follow 
logically from the assumptions. The obvious example of a Lebnizian inquiry system is pure 
mathematics. Although there may conceivably be occasions in educational research when 
such methods might be appropriate, they generally inadequate—typically inquiries into 
educational phenomena require some sort of empirical data from the situation under study.
In what Churchman called a Lockean inquiry system, the main source of evidence is 
observation of the world. Empirical data are collected, and then an attempt is made to build 
a theory that accounts for the data, or conversely, multiple theories are developed that 
generate testable hypotheses that can then form the basis of a “crucial experiment” that will 
indicate which of the theories is correct. This is the standard method of inquiry for the 
physical, life, and earth sciences. The major difficulty with a Lockean approach is that, 
because observations are central, it is necessary for all observers to agree on what they have 
observed, leading to the need for the “scientific detachment” described by Bulterman-Bos. 
If observers disagree on what they have observed, if the evidence is in doubt, then the 
Lockean inquirer cannot begin.
Philosophers of science have long recognized that all observations are theory-dependent. 
As Werner von Heisenberg observed, “What we learn about is not nature itself, but nature 
exposed to our methods of questioning” (quoted in Johnson, 1996, p. 147). Nevertheless, 
there are many situations, even within the social sciences where considerable progress can 
be made, because the relevant data are sufficiently-widely agreed to provide a fruitful 
starting point for the Lockean inquirer.
Where there is no such sufficient agreement about what the relevant data are, then a 
Kantian inquiry system is more appropriate. The Kantian inquirer accepts that there can be 
no such thing as “scientific detachment”—what is generated by any theory will inevitably 
be, to an extent, a consequence of the assumptions made by the inquirer about what 
constitutes the relevant data. Kantian inquiry involves the deliberate framing of multiple 
alternative perspectives, on both theory and data (thus incorporating both Leibnizian and 
Lockean systems). This could be done by building different theories on the basis of the 
same set of data or, alternatively, two (or more) theories related to the problem might be 
generated. For each theory, appropriate data would be collected, and it is entirely possible 
that different kinds of data might be collected for each theory.
In practice, this might mean that researchers would construct competing explanations on 
the basis of the same set of data.  These perspectives would result in part from their 
engagement in serious reflection about their underlying assumptions, and in part from 
submitting their data to the scrutiny of other persons who might have a stake in the 
research. It may not be immediately apparent where these theories overlap and where they 
conflict, and indeed, these questions may not be meaningful, in that the enquiries might be 
incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962). However, by analyzing these enquiries in more detail, it 
may be possible to begin a process of theory building that incorporates the different 
representations of the situation under study.
This idea of reconciling rival theories is more fully developed in a Hegelian inquiry system, 
where antithetical and mutually inconsistent theories are developed. Not content with 
building plausible theories, the Hegelian inquirer takes a plausible theory, and then 
investigates what would have to be different about the world for the exact opposite of the 
most plausible theory itself to be plausible. A crucial question for the Hegelian inquirer is, 
“What would have to be different about the world for the exact opposite of my conclusion 
to be plausible?” If the answer is, “not very much” then this suggests that the available data 
underdetermine to a significant degree the interpretations that are made of them.
The tension produced by confrontation between conflicting theories forces the assumptions 
of each theory to be questioned, which might then result in sufficient clarification of the 
issues to make possible a co-ordination, or even a synthesis, of the different perspectives, at 
a higher level of abstraction. The differences between Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian 
inquiry systems were summed up by Churchman as follows:
The Lockean inquirer displays the “fundamental” data that all experts agree are accurate and relevant, and 
then builds a consistent story out of these. The Kantian inquirer displays the same story from different 
points of view, emphasizing thereby that what is put into the story by the internal mode of representation 
is not given from the outside. But the Hegelian inquirer, using the same data, tells two stories, one 
supporting the most prominent policy on one side, the other supporting the most promising story on the 
other side (Churchman, 1971 p. 177).
It is tempting to view these four inquiry systems as a hierarchy, and in one sense, there 
undoubtedly is a logical order relation. The Hegelian inquiry system is a special case of a 
Kantian inquiry system, where the multiple representations are constrained to create a 
dialectic. The Lockean inquiry system (which clearly subsumes the Leibnizian inquiry 
system) is also a special kind of Kantian inquiry where one representation is singled out as 
privileged. However, this does not mean that Kantian inquiry systems are always to be 
preferred, since this may produce such complexity that progress is impossible—the most 
complex representation of a problem is not necessarily the most useful. There is a trade-off 
between parsimony and completeness, and therefore there is a choice to be made. In other 
words, we can inquire about inquiry systems, questioning the values and ethical 
assumptions that these inquiry systems embody.
This inquiry into inquiry systems is itself, of course, an inquiry system, which is termed 
Singerian by Churchman after the philosopher E. A. Singer (see Singer, 1957). Such an 
approach requires a constant questioning of the assumptions of inquiry systems. Tenets, no 
matter how fundamental they appear to be, are themselves open to challenge in order to cast 
a new light on the situation under investigation. This leads directly and naturally to 
examination of the values and ethical considerations inherent in theory building.
In a Singerian inquiry, there is no solid foundation. Instead of asking what “is,” we ask 
what are the implications and consequences of different assumptions about what “is taken 
to be”:
The “is taken to be” is a self-imposed imperative of the community. Taken in the context of the whole 
Singerian theory of inquiry and progress, the imperative has the status of an ethical judgment. That is, the 
community judges that to accept its instruction is to bring about a suitable tactic or strategy . . . . The 
acceptance may lead to social actions outside of inquiry, or to new kinds of inquiry, or whatever. Part of 
the community’s judgement is concerned with the appropriateness of these actions from an ethical point of 
view. Hence the linguistic puzzle which bothered some empiricists—how the inquiring system can pass 
linguistically from “is” statements to “ought” statements—is no puzzle at all in the Singerian inquirer: the 
inquiring system speaks exclusively in the “ought,” the “is” being only a convenient façon de parler when 
one wants to block out the uncertainty in the discourse. (Churchman, 1971 p. 202).
Within a Singerian inquiry system, one can never separate out the meanings of a piece of 
research from its consequences. Educational research is a process of representing 
educational processes, and the representations are never right or wrong, merely more or less 
appropriate for a particular purpose, and it is perfectly fair to expect the researcher to 
defend the appropriateness of the representations. Greeno (1997) suggests that educational 
researchers should assess the relative worth of competing perspectives by determining 
which perspective will contribute most to the improvement of educational practice and of 
course this evaluation must take into account the constraints of the available resources 
(both human and financial), the political and social contexts in which education takes place, 
and the likelihood of success. While the Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian inquirer can claim 
to be producing knowledge for its own sake, Singerian inquirers are required to defend to 
the community not just their methods of research, but which research they choose to 
undertake.
Singerian inquiry provides a framework for debating the issues raised by Bulterman-Bos 
about the nature of educational research. At one extreme, should all educational research be 
undertaken only by those with substantial practical experience as educators? Or at the other 
extreme, should we value as knowledge only that produced by studies designed from the 
outset to be widely generalizable? Within a Singerian framework, both are defensible, but 
the researchers should be prepared to defend their decisions. The fact that the results of 
action research are often limited to the classrooms in which the studies are conducted is 
often regarded as a weakness in traditional studies. Within a Singerian framework, 
however, radical improvements on a small scale may be regarded as a greater benefit than a 
more widely distributed, but less substantial improvement.
To sum up the argument so far, I have suggested that educational research should be 
broadened by an acceptance that a complete reliance on “scientific detachment” results in 
such limitations about what could be said that the whole enterprise becomes irrelevant, 
somewhat along the lines of Wittgenstein’s closing line in the Tractatus logico-
philosophicus: “That of which one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence” 
(Wittgenstein, 1921/1961, my translation). If we accept that educational research should 
speak about those things where we cannot pronounce with certainty and scientific 
detachment, we must accept that other intellectual virtues, and specifically, practical 
wisdom—“reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for 
people” (Aristotle, 1976 1140a24-b12, 1144b33-45a11)—become part of the requirements 
for an effective research practice. For this to occur, we must broaden the basis about what 
counts as evidence in educational research, including multiple representations of 
educational settings, and an acknowledgement that, as well as data and theories, values 
have a role to play.
This shift from a sole reliance on scientific detachment also has implications for how the 
findings of research are to be communicated, shared and “disseminated.” Shotter (1993) 
proposes that this shift can be characterized as a shift from scientific rationalism to 
communicative rationalism, which differs from scientific rationalism in three important 
ways.  First, rather than regarding the social world as "out there waiting to be discovered," 
the communicative rationalist insists that the world can only be studied from a position of 
involvement within it (in the same way that Polanyi insists that knowledge is rooted in an 
engagement with, rather than a detachment from, the object of study). Second, “knowledge 
of [the] world is practical-moral knowledge and does not depend upon justification or proof 
for its practical efficacy” (p. 166).  Third, “we are not in an ‘ownership’ relation to such 
knowledge, but we embody it as part of who and what we are”  (loc. cit.).
Embracing communicative rationalism involves changes in not only in how knowledge is 
warranted, but also in what is to count as knowledge. The practical knowledge that teachers 
possess about their classrooms—and in particular how to make complex, nuanced 
judgments in the face of considerable complexity and absence of complete information—is 
to be counted as knowledge even though such knowledge may be tacit, and cannot be 
reduced to the explicit formulations of the decontextualized, transcendent, but often 
difficult-to-apply “truths” of scientific rationalism.
 
The complementary roles of tacit and explicit knowledge are brought out clearly in the 
model of knowledge-creation in organizations developed by Nonaka and Tageuchi (1995). 
The fact that knowledge can exist either as explicit or tacit results in four different modes of 
knowledge conversion, as shown in Figure 2. The process of socialization can be viewed as 
one in which one person’s tacit knowledge comes to be shared by others, while 
externalization involves making previously tacit knowledge explicit. Developing new 
explicit knowledge from existing explicit knowledge is a process of combination, and 
internalization consists of making explicit knowledge “one’s own.” Nonaka and Tageuchi 
(1995) then propose that these four processes typically occur in the following sequence:
First, the socialization mode usually starts with building a “field” of interaction. This field facilitates the 
sharing of members” experiences and mental models. Second, the externalization mode is triggered by 
meaningful “dialogue or collective reflection,” in which using appropriate metaphor or analogy helps team 
members to articulate hidden tacit knowledge that is otherwise hard to communicate. Third, the 
combination mode is triggered by “networking” newly created knowledge and existing knowledge from 
other sections of the organization, thereby crystallizing them into a new product, service or managerial 
system. Finally, “learning by doing” triggers internalization. (pp. 70-71)
<< Figure 2 about here >>
What this analysis makes clear is that scientific rationalism is concerned only with those 
situations in which one person’s explicit knowledge is transmitted to others as explicit 
knowledge—(bottom-right cell of Figure 1). Communicative rationalism, on the other 
hand, involves all the kinds of knowledge-creation shown in Figure 1.
The framework offered by Nonaka and Tageuchi allows us to regard the knowledge that is 
generated in a clinical practice approach to research alongside that generated by more 
traditional forms of inquiry. More importantly, it offers a way of thinking about how we 
might move beyond these dualities to a more integrated approach to knowledge 
management. The systemic knowledge generated as a result of  “traditional” research can 
become operational knowledge through “learning by doing.” This operational knowledge 
becomes sympathized knowledge when experience of practitioners is shared, and dialogue 
between teachers supports the creation of conceptual knowledge in practice. Networking 
with other professionals produces new systemic knowledge, and so the cycle can repeat.
Conclusion
In this response I have used three theoretical perspectives in an attempt to illuminate, and to 
deepen the argument made by Bulterman-Bos about the contributions that a clinical 
approach might make to educational research.
First I suggested that the three main intellectual virtues identified by Aristotle—episteme, 
techne, and phronesis—exemplify the skills required by the “pure” educational researcher, 
the skilled classroom practitioner, and the clinical researcher respectively. Second I 
proposed that the framework of inquiry systems proposed by Churchman—based on 
whether logic, observation, representation, dialectic, or values were regarded as the main 
source of evidence—provided a useful way of thinking about different kinds of inquiry in 
education. Specifically, I suggested that while the phronetic researcher  may be, at any one 
time, operating in Leibnizian, Lockean, Kantian or Hegelian mode, these are always moral 
choices that the researcher is prepared to defend, since the primary aim is to do good. 
Third, I suggested that the framework for knowledge transfer proposed by Nonaka & 
Tageuchi (1996) indicates a way in which knowledge gained through different methods of 
inquiry might be developed in parallel, and perhaps even integrated, so that educational 
research can become a powerful force for acting well in the world.
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